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Abstract.
This paper focuses on induction, because the supposed weaknesses of that process  
are the main reason for favouring falsificationism, which plays an important part in  
scientific  methodology  generally;  the paper  is  part  of  a  wider  study  of  economic  
methodology. The standard objections to, and paradoxes of, induction are reviewed,  
and this leads to the conclusion that the supposed ‘problem’ or ‘riddle’ of induction  
is a false one. It is an artefact of two assumptions: that the classic two-valued logic 
(CL) is appropriate for the contexts in which induction is relevant; and that it is the  
touchstone of rational thought. The status accorded to CL is the result of historical  
and cultural factors.
The material we need to reason about falls into four distinct domains; these  
are explored in turn, while progressively relaxing the restrictions that are essential to  
the  valid  application  of  CL.  The  restrictions  include  the  requirement  for  a  pre-
existing, independently-guaranteed classification, into which we can fit all new cases  
with  certainty;  and  non-ambiguous  relationships  between  antecedents  and 
consequents. Natural kinds, determined by the existence of complex entities whose 
characteristics cannot be unbundled and altered in a piecemeal, arbitrary fashion,  
play an important part in the review; so also does fuzzy logic (FL). These are used to  
resolve two famous paradoxes about induction (the grue and raven paradoxes); and 
the case for believing that conventional logic is a subset of fuzzy logic is outlined. The 
latter disposes of all questions of justifying induction deductively.
The concept of problem structure is used as the basis for a structured concept  
of rationality that is appropriate to all four of the domains mentioned above.
The rehabilitation of induction supports an alternative definition of science:  
that it is the business of developing networks of contrastive, constitutive explanations 
of  reproducible,  inter-subjective  (‘objective’)  data.  Social  and  psychological  
obstacles  ensure  the  progress  of  science  is  slow  and  convoluted;  however,  the 
relativist arguments against such a project are rejected.
1 Contact address: 
Dr Peter Smith, Springcott, Chittlehamholt, Devon EX37 9PD, UK.
Tel +44 (01769) 540 571. Email: manindev@yahoo.com. 
1
Introduction.
This working paper is part of a larger investigation into the problems of the methodology of 
economics,  considered  as  a  science:  what  should  its  foundational  assumptions  be;  what 
should be its scope and purpose; what should count as valid evidence; what should count as a 
significant anomaly; and what should give us confidence in any extensive, coherent body of 
economic ideas (such as neo-classical economics). Induction is relevant to this in a number of 
ways. 
Philosophers have long regarded induction as objectionable in principle. Concerns 
about induction contribute to the low status accorded to empirical evidence by economists [1] 
(although they are certainly not the only factor responsible).  Secondly, the desire to sidestep 
the  ‘problem  of  induction’  motivated  the  single  most  widely  advocated  scientific 
methodology, falsificationism, which is the approach most commonly espoused by those few 
economists who do concern themselves with methodological issues – although even among 
them, it is honoured more in the breach than in the observance [2, 3]. Thirdly, dealing with 
induction draws in techniques and perspectives (including fuzzy logic and a richer concept of 
rationality) that have important implications for scientific methodology in general; restoring 
the respectability of induction will inevitably imply other changes. I hope to show that the 
supposed problem of induction is a false one, an artefact of an exclusive adherence to one 
particular style of logic, referred to here as conventional logic2 (CL). 
Most of the general philosophical discussion of induction focuses on induction by 
simple  enumeration.  (Strictly  speaking,  the  process  of  inferring  theories,  rather  than  the 
properties of members of a class is abduction, but the same considerations apply to both.) In 
this, we have a known species – a mineral, such beryl, or a biological species, such as Corvus 
corax3 – and we see successive instances of it. It is alleged that if, at a certain point in time, 
every emerald we have seen is green, every raven black, and so on, then we will believe that 
‘all emeralds are green’, ‘all ravens are black’, etc, with a degree of conviction that increases 
with the number of positive instances encountered (presumably in an asymptotic manner). 
Those philosophers who are worried by ‘the problem of induction’ are concerned that we 
cannot possibly know that all cases will fit the observed rule; but they also fret about the lack 
of a respectable basis for our ability to apply this ‘improper’ pattern of reasoning selectively. 
2 This term refers here to two-valued logics, in which the laws of contradiction and excluded middle 
apply, and in which the principle that a contradiction implies the truth of any other proposition (this last 
qualification excludes variants such as relevance logic [4]).
3 Emeralds are a variety of beryl, coloured green by impurities; Corvus corax is, as every schoolchild 
knows, the raven. Both figure in the famous paradoxes introduced later.  
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(As the logician Susan Haack points out, if you had seen only philosophers who wear beards, 
you would probably not feel that you can reasonably infer that all philosophers wear beards.) 
The framing of this supposed problem contains a dangerous assumption. It assumes 
that we have no problem in assigning new instances of anything that comes along to pre-
existing, well-defined categories – i.e., that we have somehow been provided with a ready-
made,  totally  reliable  classification  system.  This  does  not  depend  on  our  previous 
observations of the distribution of colours and other properties of minerals, birds, etc4, and 
whose categories  are  crisp,  excluding the  possibility of  overlaps,  ‘grey areas’,  etc.  Some 
readers will  have already reached for  the  blunderbuss of  commonsense to deal  with this, 
sensing – rightly – that the apparent problem is something to do with natural kinds of objects, 
and their inherent or essential properties. Those who do are in good company: John Stuart 
Mill noted the logical problems, set them firmly aside, and went on to develop his principles 
of induction, still  an important part  of scientific method [5];  but  one consequence of this 
sturdy commonsense reaction is that the sceptical attitude to induction keeps re-appearing, 
like a thistle growing up through a neatly-paved yard. 
2. Induction in Practice.
In  one exceptionally striking example  of  induction,  Dmitri  Mendeleev (expanding on the 
earlier efforts of others) detected some interesting patterns in the properties of the chemical 
elements when arranged in order of atomic weight5, and, in constructing his Periodic Table of  
Elements,  drew the conclusion that  this  pattern reflected something fundamental.  On this 
basis, he correctly forecast the existence and properties of new elements (e.g., germanium) 
that  corresponded  to  ‘holes’ in  the  table.  His  forecasts  of  their  physical  and  chemical 
properties were strikingly accurate.  He even amended the ordering of elements by atomic 
weight, where the pattern suggested that there might be an error in the observations, or some 
unknown disturbing factor at work. In each case, his judgment was eventually vindicated [6]. 
Mendeleev  had,  in  effect,  inferred  from ‘all  known elements,  from an  extensive 
sample, conform to the pattern P’ that ‘… therefore, all elements conform to P’. But there is 
no legitimate way in conventional logic (CL) of quantifying ‘all known instances, from an 
extensive sample’: you can only have ‘all’,  ‘none’, or ‘some’. ‘Some’ has a very different 
meaning from ‘all known, reliable instances from what we think is a thorough sample’, but 
4 It also assumes that our system of classification assures us that ‘minerals’, ‘birds’, etc are valid, crisp 
categories, of course. 
5 Strictly, this should be ‘relative atomic mass’. 
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this important difference cannot even be expressed in CL, which treats inferences such as 
Mendeleev’s as identical with this one: 
- some four-legged animals [e.g., rabbits] are easy to kill and delicious in a casserole; 
- therefore all four-legged animals are easy to kill and delicious in a casserole
The  dangers  of  the  over-enthusiastic  use  of  this  pattern  of  reasoning  are  fairly 
obvious, even to us non-philosophers, and this very construction has been used to argue that 
evolutionary forces will ensure that we all learn to use CL (except that we do not, of course.) 
We will see later that the problem lies in the belief that truth should be determined by the 
form of a chain of reasoning, and never by its technical content,  in all possible domains of  
subject matter that we might need to reason about. Patrick O’Sullivan, in a manner typical of 
this  school,  says  that  induction  is  a  ‘logical  fallacy’,  ‘which  must  ultimately  fail  when 
arraigned before the court of Reason [sic]’; but he then goes on to say that its use may be 
‘reasonable’, but can never be ‘rational’, apparently not noticing the dual use of ‘reason’ [7]. I 
hope to show this view of induction is deeply mistaken, and that richer, more differentiated 
concept of rationality exists, one that reconciles ‘Reason’, ‘rational’, and ‘reasonable’. The 
confusion here arises from the historical tendency of many philosophers to ignore – in their 
professional capacity – the possibility that we may need to reason about subjects that may not 
comply  with  the  conditions  required  by  CL.  Since  the  middle  of  the  20th Century,  this 
situation  has  changed  considerably  [8],  but  many  philosophers  still  recognize  only 
conventional, deductive logic; and this has led to an enormous (but ultimately pointless) body 
of literature concerned with whether induction can be given a sound basis in deductive logic. 
A lot of the more recent material of this type has attempted to resolve two famous paradoxes 
about induction, which are considered next. 
In what follows, examples from a range of sciences are treated as relevant to the basic 
issues  of  induction;  however,  using such examples  is  not  intended as  an endorsement  of 
scientific  monism  in  the  conventional  sense.. Monism asserts  that  there  is  only  one 
scientific  methodology  (that  supposedly  in  use  in  the  natural  sciences).  Dualism 
asserts that the human sciences require a distinct methodology of their own; this is 
often  associated  with  claims  that  humans  have  especially  trustworthy  ‘a  priori’ 
insights into human behaviour, and that theorems deduced from these insights need no 
empirical verification [more on this in the main study, where this ‘apriorism’ is rejected]. 
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2.1 The Two Paradoxes of Induction. 
Goodman’s  Grue  Paradox.    Nelson Goodman  developed invented  the  term ‘grue’,  and 
applied it to emeralds. (Both paradoxes are dealt with at length in [9].) An emerald is grue if 
either it was examined at or before a particular (future) instant in time,  T, and found to be 
green; or it is first examined after T, and will then be found to be blue. The rationale for this 
peculiar construction is the supposition that we feel further confirmed in our belief that ‘all 
emeralds are green’, by every additional green emerald we encounter. However, every green 
emerald  seen  at  or  before  T also  confirms  ‘all  emeralds  are  grue’,  and  just  as  strongly. 
Accordingly, we should believe both that emeralds are green, and that they are grue – but the 
predictions from these inferences contradict each other, as to the colour of any emerald that is 
first  inspected after  T.  Goodman thought  that  the  possibility that  induction could lead to 
contradictions could be resolved by introducing a new concept, projectibility: a predicate such 
as green is projectible, whereas grue is not. 
Nobody is very happy with this. First of all, ‘projectibility’ seems to be circular, in 
that something is projectible if and only if it has been projected successfully in the past. Then, 
it seems odd that the predicate, rather than the subject, should control what sort of inferences 
may be drawn. (What about predicates that can legitimately be projected for some subjects, 
but not others, e.g., bearded billy-goats versus bearded philosophers?) It would have been at 
least as sensible to outlaw inductions about as-yet unobserved phenomena; in what follows, I 
hope to show that the idea of projectibility is redundant. 
Hempel’s Raven Paradox.     Assuming that black is not part of the definition of ‘raven’; and 
assuming  that  we  can  identify  and  safely exclude  ‘abnormal’ specimens,  such  as  albino 
ravens; and assuming that competent observers do in fact apply confirmatory new instances 
in the way that some philosophers suggest; then each new black raven should strengthen our 
belief in the proposition ‘all ravens are black’. So far, so good … but in CL, all logically 
equivalent propositions should have the same significance, and ‘everything that is not black is 
not a raven’ is logically equivalent to ‘all ravens are black’. Therefore, an encounter with a 
yellow banana, a pink gorilla, etc should all have the same impact on our convictions about 
the essential blackness of ravens as actually seeing another black raven. This offends against 
almost everybody’s understanding of induction. The usual response has been built around the 
idea of ‘natural kinds’: it is safe to apply induction to natural kinds, such as ‘ravens’, but the 
complement of a natural kind (e.g.,  non-black non-ravens) is generally not itself a natural 
kind, and therefore outside the legitimate scope of induction. Although this makes sense, I 
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will argue later that the idea of natural kinds is not needed to resolve this paradox (although it 
has other important applications, see below).  
3. The Domains of Reason. 
The perceived ‘problems’ or ‘riddles’ of induction arise from a failure to recognize that the 
matters we may need to reason about belong to four distinct domains, and that the stringent 
conditions required by CL are met in only one of these. (The reasons for this failure seem to 
be purely historical and cultural; for many centuries, this was the only logic formally taught in 
the West [10]; however, Aristotle was aware of its limitations, see below.) These domains are:
3.1 Domain I: The Heartlands.  
This consists of subject matter in which every contrast set is completely divided into mutually 
exclusive, non-overlapping categories, with precise boundaries. Where this is the case, the 
laws of excluded middle (LEM) and non-contradiction (LNC) apply: nothing can be neither X 
nor not-X, and nothing can be both X and not-X. In this artificial context, a raven cannot be 
both black and non-black, and it is forbidden to be neither black nor non-black. Here, we 
always know with certainty the properties of any item we are presented with, and how to 
classify  it.  (The  term ‘crisp’  distinguishes  such  categories  from fuzzy  ones,  see  below.) 
Within this  domain,  truth is  indeed formal,  depending solely on the syntax of a chain of 
reasoning, and not at all on its technical content; a valid pattern of reasoning is one that is 
incapable of generating falsehood, given true inputs.  
In this domain, the pursuit of absolute truth and the total elimination of error are both 
reasonable aims, and there is no reason even to wish for a mechanism to do what induction 
does, i.e., provide new, additional grist for the logical mill. This grist consists of propositions 
that  we  are  prepared  to  set  up,  perhaps  provisionally,  as  postulates  or  axioms;  and 
propositions that are analytic, and therefore necessarily true. Deductions from propositions of 
the first kind are, of course, conditional on the truth of the axioms. As defined by Kant (see 
Box 1), the analytic category is quite capacious, but faith in the existence of non-tautologous 
analytic propositions has declined drastically [11]. In terms of the argument presented below, 
the central problem is that anything of this kind has to be derived from knowledge of the 
external  world,  and virtually nothing we  can know about  that  conforms  to  the  standards 
required for the application of CL (see below).    
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7Box 1: The Concept of Analyticity.
When Kant  introduced  the synthetic  /  analytic  distinction,  he said  that  something was  analytic  if  the 
concept of the predicate was contained in the concept of the subject (as ‘not being married’ is contained in 
the idea of ‘bachelor’), and is therefore necessarily true; and that every other proposition is synthetic. Kant 
also distinguished between an a priori frame of reference – including space and time – which he believed 
to be inbuilt  into the human mind, and which was necessary for us to be able to make sense of the 
external world, and a posteriori knowledge, which could only be derived from experience. In his view, our 
perceptions are therefore a joint product of our internal frame of reference, and the stimulus we receive 
from external objects; Lindsay [12] gives a clear exposition of the two distinctions, and explains some of 
the confusion and inconsistency in  The Critique of Pure Reason. The two distinctions give rise to three 
combinations (nothing can be both analytic and a posteriori, of course):
− Analytic & a priori: we know things such as ‘material objects have extension in space’, but cannot 
give a reason why it is so. 
− Synthetic & a priori:  this includes geometry – our a priori framework makes us aware of space 
and some very basic concepts, but ideas such as ‘circle’ also have a contribution from experience 
(e.g., from the construction of geometric figures).  When von Mises and Robbins [13, 14] try to 
assert that the fundamental truths of economics are ‘a priori’, they are actually placing them in this 
category. 
− Synthetic & a posteriori: this sort of knowledge is, of course, the subject matter of all the technical, 
scientific, and humanities disciplines. 
There  are  a  number  of  problems  with  this  formulation.  First,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  a  priori 
framework  actually  exists,  or  that  it  is  not  learnt  through some combination of  direct  experience and 
cultural transmission (so that it could be otherwise, and is therefore not analytic) – this certainly seems to 
be he case for our perceptions of space, time, and the way that material objects occupy space. Secondly, 
‘contained in’ is a much looser specification than ‘true by definition’, and Kant gave us no test for deciding 
when  some  quality  of  a  particular  predicate  was  contained  in  its  subject;  obviously,  unrecognized 
assumptions can enter through this gap. These weaknesses are illustrated by Kant’s belief that Newtonian 
absolute space and time are a priori, and that there was legitimate ‘synthetic’ data that could be combined 
with it to prove that Newtonian mechanics had to be so, in the same way that Pythagoras’ Theorem has to 
be true for plane triangles [15] – despite the fact that we actually live in a relativistic universe (even if it is 
not apparent with everyday masses and velocities). Similarly, it is difficult to square the idea of an a priori 
frame of reference with many quantum phenomena, so much so that explaining them challenges our idea 
of what ‘understanding’ means [16].   
3.2 Domain II: The Frontier.   
Nothing in the physical or social worlds can meet the standards for full citizenship in the 
Heartlands. In this second domain, we know neither all the properties of the objects we have 
to deal  with,  nor,  indeed,  how we should classify them.  This is  not  a trivial  problem:  in 
chemistry  alone,  the  lack  of  a  classification  system  that  distinguished  mixtures  from 
compounds held back the development of the atomic theory for many decades, and the early 
chemists’ lack of a scheme of classification that would have enabled them to recognize that 
there are three states of matter, solid, liquid, and gas, contributed greatly to the difficulty of 
moving beyond the phlogiston theory of combustion, and impeded the discovery of oxygen 
[17].  In  psychology,  the  ways  in  which  individuals  construct,  inductively,  their  own, 
individual systems of classification – relating to social relations, work, and so on – have huge 
effects on their levels of well-being and achievement [18].  
This limitation makes the possibility of error inseparable from action or investigation 
in the real world, and it forces us to treat all our hypotheses and theories as provisional ones. 
A typical sequence comes from the history of medicine. Scientists investigated a sequence of 
infectious  diseases,  found  that  each  fitted  a  causal  explanation  that  revolved  around 
microscopic living agents, and concluded that all infectious diseases are bacterial in origin. 
Then they found other disease-causing agents (the viruses) that are not living, but consist of a 
body of genetic code (wrapped in a minimal delivery and protection system) that reproduced 
itself by hijacking the cellular apparatus of its victims. This seemed to show that all infectious 
diseases rely on transmission of the genetic blueprint of the causal agent – until someone 
discovered that some (the prions) rely on a direct transmission by contact of a pathological 
version of the shape of certain proteins. Now, even this list seems too short [19]. 
In every case,  we have to infer  the proper way to classify objects  from what  we 
observe;  we do  not  infer  the  properties  of  members  of  given classes  (such as  ravens,  or 
emeralds, or swans) by observing instances of them. This process is inevitably iterative, and 
involves a lot of bootstrapping. The scientific systems of classification that we now use with 
(occasionally excessive) confidence rest on centuries of such effort. Our rough, preliminary 
attempts at classification have led us into error, and will inevitably do so again. ‘Failures’ of 
this kind will force us to revise both the divisions that we make, and our choice of which 
aspects of the objects we examine to use as the basis of our judgments about classification; 
massive changes have taken place in biological  classification over the last  thirty years  in 
precisely this way. (Because classification is such a central issue, Box 2 examines it in more 
detail.) 
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9Box 2: 
Classification and Natural Kinds.
Science  is  interested  in  explanation  across  a  wide  range  of  contexts.  Accordingly,  it  focuses  on 
explanations that are (i) contrastive, explaining why a specimen of X does this rather than that;  and (ii), 
constitutive, explaining in terms of the sort of thing it is, and its history. 
Electronic structure does this for chemical  species;  and genetic relationships do the same for 
biological organisms. In the social sciences, good classifications enable us to say things like ‘this group 
responded by doing X, while that one responded by doing Y, because ….’ Henry Mintzberg’s classification 
of organizations on the basis of the internal mechanism of coordination and their external relations with 
key stakeholders is a good example [20]; Bailey’s classification of the membership of political groups into 
core and following is another [21]. Classification and theorizing interact, of course.    
In all these cases, the reason that there are distinct kinds is that what an individual specimen does 
and how it reacts depend upon a complex internal structure, which cannot be changed in an arbitrary, 
piecemeal fashion without destroying it [22]. Much philosophical discussion of problems of classification 
seems  quite  footling  (e.g.,  the  discussion  of  the  problems  of  classifying  objects  which  are  various 
combinations of round, red, and wooden, cited in Quine’s contribution to [23]), precisely because it ignores 
the significance of internal complexity in determining natural kinds. 
Classification also has implications for how instances confirm inductive generalizations. Often, 
initial observations on a particular phenomenon make little impact; then a single critical finding breaks a 
conceptual log-jam, requiring only a relatively small number of successful attempts to replicate it, before it 
is accepted. (The distinction between replication – i.e., making sure that the original observation is not a 
product of technical error or self-deception, or even fraud – and confirmation is an important one.) For 
example, the role of DNA in genetics was rapidly accepted, without extensive confirmation in a range of 
species, because the nucleus, chromosomes, and their biochemical components were already accepted 
as natural kinds. 
This contrasts with, say, the slow recognition of the importance and generality of what were 
originally known as heat-shock proteins. Following their original discovery in the early 1960s, it took a long 
series of wide-ranging investigations to convince the relevant community that they represented a fairly 
universal phenomenon – not because there was any intrinsic resistance to the idea, but because protein 
shape was not then perceived as the basis for a ‘natural kind’ [24, 25].
By the time that we have uncovered one of these ‘failures’, we have already 
paid the price of our ignorance (by, for example, applying medical treatments that could not 
work in an unrecognised but distinct sub-category of infectious diseases). Remedying it is 
then an achievement of rational activity, not a penalty for fallacious reasoning. What some 
philosophers have taken to be the products of fallacious reasoning are actually the very things 
that science seeks: interesting and informative failures of induction. (The situation in applied 
fields is more complicated, because what counts as a failure there is culpable failure, which is 
defined by the community involved.) 
If there were some better attainable standard of knowledge for this domain – one that 
gave, perhaps, the level of certainty attainable in the heartlands of CL – it would make sense 
to speak of a ‘problem of induction’. But there is little point in treating as a problem that 
needs solving our inability to accomplish something that is, by definition, impossible; and it is 
nonsense to speak of a ‘problem of induction’ or ‘riddle of induction’. Induction is the only 
way to widen our understanding of the situation in which we find ourselves. 
3.3 Domain III: The Badlands.    
Outside  the  previous  domain,  there  lies  another,  in  which the  problem of  not  having an 
independently-guaranteed system of classification of the phenomena around us is aggravated 
by weakness of the functional links between antecedents and consequents: we cannot say with 
certainty, ‘if it is an X, then it will do Y in situation Z’. Even when we can classify individual 
situations reasonably accurately, and perhaps even measure all the variables that our existing 
knowledge  suggests  are  important,  their  dynamics  may  be  such  that  they  can  evolve  in 
surprising ways. We find, with hindsight, that the numbers (or other descriptors) did not mean 
what we thought they meant at the time, i.e., they are ambiguous; this is very common with 
macroeconomic data, for example. (The problem is emphatically not one of stochasticity.)
Induction, in the accepted sense, does not work here. Aristotle – more famous for his 
work within the confines of  CL – was already aware of  this  problem [26] in relation to 
biology and ethics. In the latter context, he wrote:
… in  discussing  [these]  subjects,  and arguing  from evidence,  we  must  be 
satisfied with a broad outline of the truth; that is, in arguing about what is for  
the most part so, from premisses which are for the most part true, we must be  
content to draw conclusions that are similarly qualified.
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How we can reach a stage of ‘contentment’ about our conclusions, in which 
we are reasonably confident that we have made the best use of our input information 
without going beyond what it warrants, is the concern of fuzzy logic (FL). This is a 
rigorous calculus of reasoning, which differs from CL in the following ways: 
(i) The object of DL is to derive absolutely reliable conclusions from data that are 
known to be true. The object of CL is to formalize two important aspects of practical 
reasoning. It enables us to extend the knowledge that we have about well-defined sets 
to  related  ones  (e.g.,  to  interpolate  between  our  knowledge  about  honest 
administrations and wholly corrupt ones). And it helps us to derive, from data that are 
quantitatively vague, qualitative, or ambiguous, conclusions that limit the amount of 
harm that can result from mis- or over-interpreting the data. Ross [27] describes the 
details, and gives a very thorough analysis of the relationship between CL and FL.  
(ii)  CL  uses  only  two  truth-values,  true  and  false,  to  determine,  with  absolute 
certainty,  whether or not some item belongs to a given, crisp set. Fuzzy logic uses 
membership values that can take on any value from zero to one inclusive, which say 
how typical a particular item is of a given fuzzy set. A membership of zero indicates 
that  the item is  a non-member,  and one,  that  it  is  a perfect,  typical  member.  The 
sources of fuzziness are outlined in Box 3. 
(iii)  The  sets  in  CL  are,  by  assumption,  given;  those  in  FL  are  determined  by 
membership  functions,  which  are  empirically  determined6.  A  particular  fuzzy  set 
consists of all those things to which its ‘parent’ membership function assigns a non-
zero membership value. Membership functions convert ‘readings’ about the situation 
(say,  indicators  of the level  of market  confidence  in economics)  to a  membership 
value in one or more fuzzy sets, such as low confidence); the input is from a support 
scale (or scales), which may be quantitative or qualitative. 
(iv) In FL, but not in CL, an item can be a member (to varying extents) in different classes 
within a contrast set. In CL, a contrast set such as ‘sentient beings’ might be divided into 
‘mortals’ and ‘immortals’ (gods, etc); and it would be assumed that the dividing lines are 
absolutely precise, so that nothing can be ‘somewhat’ immortal. (Thus we get the famous 
expository example: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal.) In 
FL, these dividing lines are imprecise. 
6 Membership functions can be determined from: special cases about which we have some theoretical 
knowledge;  from  historical  data;  by  calibrating  the  rules  implicit  in  the  actions  of  experienced 
operators; or by optimisation through some simulated learning process.
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(v) Accordingly, FL has neither a LNC nor a LEM (although all the other rules and 
theorems of CL are carried over into FL). If we believe we have good evidence that red-
haired people are hot tempered, DL forbids us to draw any conclusions from this about the 
temperament of anyone whose hair is merely ‘reddish’; FL does not. This enables FL to 
handle approximate knowledge; it can, for example, process qualitative information about 
system dynamics that can be described qualitatively, but not expressed as a mathematical 
function (for an example from economics, see [28]). 
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Box 3: The Sources of Fuzziness.  
The  key  variables  of  some  systems  are  inherently  qualitative,  and  cannot  be  assigned  a 
numerical value, but neither are they discrete qualities. Flavours, scents, and physical textures 
are good examples [29]. Many other systems have qualitative aspects that can be assigned a 
numerical value, but only at the cost of severe loss of information, or distortion of meaning; the 
extent  to  which  an  administration  is  corrupt,  the extent  to  which  a  particular  line  of  RD is 
promising, or the balance of success and failure in an ongoing conflict are examples. 
The distortion-of-meaning effect is illustrated by the current UK rules for assessing the 
adequacy of a pension fund to meet its future obligations. Although the rules generate a number 
that  determines trustees’  statutory obligations,  what sum is  actually needed is also strongly 
affected by qualitative, uncertain (not merely risky) factors: the choice of discount rate for the 
calculation,  the  interaction  of  the  recent  historic  trends  of  increasing  life-expectancy  and 
increasing obesity-related morbidity – and of course, the forecast performance of bonds and 
shares. The classic case of this effect is the relative body-count measure of military success 
during the US/ Vietnam conflict, which appeared to show that the former was winning the war, 
almost up to the final, desperate evacuation of the embassy in Saigon in 1975 [30]. 
Variables that are ostensibly numerical may also be fuzzy, if they are generated by a 
process that is sufficiently nonlinear to ensure that historical data give a poor and misleading 
indication of future events [31]; many applications of fuzzy logic concern systems with variables 
of this kind [32]. It is, of course, an error to assume that, when someone makes a choice, that 
choice implies specific values for any underlying fuzzy variables; this is only true if the mapping 
from those variables to actions is one-to-one and invertible, and this is not normally the case for 
ill-structured and wickedly-structured choices (see Section 4, below). 
 (v) In CL, truth is formal/ syntactic, depending only the form or pattern of the reasoning; in 
FL,  it  depends  upon  the  membership  functions,  which  are  empirical,  and  express  our 
knowledge about the situation. Box 4 looks at an aspect of truth and fuzziness in more detail.
3.3.1 The Implications of Fuzziness. 
In the context of methodology, the recognition of fuzziness transforms a number of issues of 
fundamental importance. For example, it exposes as a fallacy the claim that it is ‘logically’ 
impossible  to  compare  the  subjective  impacts  of  different  economic  actions  (purchasing 
goods, paying taxes, etc on different individuals (cf [33] with [34]).   More basically, fuzzy 
logic  collapses  into  deductive  logic  if  all  the  classes  (input  and  output)  involved  in 
propositions are discrete [35], i.e., deductive logic is a special case of fuzzy. 
This is relevant to the grue paradox. If ‘previously unseen emeralds are green when 
first  inspected  at  or  before  T,  but  blue thereafter’  is  rewritten as  a  fuzzy rule,  the  input 
membership  functions  have  to  be  based  on  time,  not  colour  (since  grue  and  green  are 
currently identical in that respect), and there are two of them, (upto-and-including-  T   and after-
T),  neither one fuzzy.  Similarly,  the corresponding output  membership functions are both 
single points, specifying a single, defined, non-fuzzy colour (Goodman ignored the possibility 
of shades of green.) But this represents a scheme of inference from conventional deductive 
logic!  
Goodman wanted to demonstrate that induction can give rise to contradictions, but he 
did not even manage to escape from the domain of CL into one in which induction is relevant. 
All he has given us is a piece of legitimate but hypothetical deductive reasoning showing that, 
if emeralds are grue, then the first emerald newly-inspected after noon tomorrow will be blue. 
Well, I’ll go to the foot of our stairs7 …
7 This is a Mancunian expression, indicating that the speaker is only minimally impressed.  
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Box 4: Truth and Fuzziness.
 
Haack refers to this method of inference as the base logic of FL in her book Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic, 
and  sees  nothing  objectionable  in  it  [36].  She  argues  that  fuzzy  models,  inputs,  and  the  standard 
processes of fuzzy inference are valid, but takes issue with those exponents of FL who claim that it is 
truth that is fuzzy. However, ‘truth’ can be used to label the outcome of particular test (‘is this less than 
one metre in length?’), or to define a process (‘truth is established by empirical verification’): the results 
of comparison with a standard, versus the comparison process itself. In the former case, in principle, all 
statements about the real world are fuzzy, except those that that involve discrete variables; in the latter, 
we would be saying that the comparison process itself is fuzzy. Can this ever make sense? 
I believe that it can. In a later work, Evidence and Inquiry [37], Haack makes a convincing case 
for believing that neither foundationism nor coherentism on its own can justify our confidence in a body 
of knowledge. Foundationism seeks to derive utterly reliable conclusions by deduction (using CL, of 
course),  from foundations  whose  truth  is  guaranteed.  The  different  versions  of  foundationism  take 
different guarantors for their foundations. These include: revelation; the supposed reliability of certain 
kinds of empirical data; and the supposed reliability of some introspection. Its appeal is the apparent 
strength and integrity of the knowledge structure it would give rise to. However, in the context of science, 
all  versions of foundationism are vulnerable to the fact that real  world phenomena do not meet the 
requirements  for  reasoning  with  conventional  logic,  i.e.,  the  potential  strength  of  any  chunk  of 
foundationist knowledge is undermined by the inherent weakness of the mortar used to construct it (and 
the guarantors can always be disputed, of course). 
The  main  established  alternative,  coherentism,  claims  that  our  confidence  in  a  body  of 
knowledge should depend on the coherence of the evidence in its favour. Unfortunately, coherence is 
not easy to define; it has to include scope, to avoid triviality; and the links cannot be constructed with 
conventional  deductive  logic,  since  that  would  mean  that  the  uncovering  of  a  single  error  would 
invalidate the whole. The latter is not such a problem, if you accept the validity of FL, but full-blooded 
coherentism does also carry the obvious risk of validating internally-consistent fairy-tales. Instead, she 
suggests that we should adopt a hybrid, ‘foundherentism’. In this, we accept that our confidence in the 
diverse elements of a body of knowledge may vary; different elements may give each other mutual 
support; different sorts of evidence may carry different weights (either as confirmation or anomaly); and 
we may have to tolerate, pro tem, inconsistencies of the quantum/ relativity kind (e.g., if there is more 
than one sort of heavily-weighted, ‘privileged’ evidence). Foundherentism cannot be made operational in 
a specified field of study, without using FL [an attempt to do this is made in the investigation of economic 
methodology,  of  which  this  Working  Paper  forms  part].  But  consider  an  applied  version  of 
foundherentism that relied on both correspondence with certain sorts of empirical data, and some strong 
theoretical beliefs about what is necessarily the case. This will need to use different sub-criteria, with 
different weights, based on qualitative criteria, at different times; here, the actual process of comparing 
assertions with the (complex) standard does seem to be fuzzy. 
 The case of the raven paradox is even simpler. In the domain to which FL applies, the 
law of the excluded middle does  not apply. There may be, for example, overlaps between 
ravens and non-ravens, and between black and non-black. (Ravens might belong to a ring 
species, as do some of the gulls8, where there are intergrades between certain apparently well-
defined species.  And ‘black’,  in the real  world,  is  quite  variable – my cat’s  black fur is 
brownish-black at certain seasons, and this is more apparent in some lights than others.) As a 
result, in this domain, we cannot argue that ‘all X are Y’ is equivalent to ‘all non-X are not-Y’; 
here, you cannot even set the paradox up. Presumably,  Hempel saw brushing-aside of the 
difficulties of constructing examples that are both realistic and tractable (under CL) as an 
innocent approximation, but it is actually quite pernicious. The very difficulty of constructing 
such examples should, perhaps, have been taken as a warning that the subject matter involved 
might not always fall into the crisp categories required by CL. 
 
3.4 Domain (IV): The Howling Wastes. 
In leaving the heartlands of logic, we entered two domains (the frontier and the badlands, 
Domains II and III) in which we could no longer be sure of being able to classify accurately 
the things that we need to reason about;  where, indeed, exploring the relevant systems of 
classification is a major part of gaining an understanding of the world about us. In neither of 
these domains is there any fundamental disagreement about how to classify entities, or their 
behaviours  and  properties.  However,  in  all  sciences  in  times  of  radical  change,  when 
paradigms are being replaced (see below), these matters are disputed. The same is true (most 
of the time) in the human sciences, and wherever scientific positions have implications for the 
distribution of obligations, authority, material rewards, or status – as there are in economics, 
for example. 
In such cases,  ‘rational’ thought or  behaviour clearly cannot  mean,  ‘that  which is 
sanctioned  by  conventional  logic’  –  with  the  restrictions  that  implies  on  admissible 
information. This revives an issue that we met with earlier, the supposed distinctions among 
Reason,  rational,  and  reasonable  (see  Section  2,  above).  In  the  next  Section,  I  hope  to 
convince you that there is no justification for these distinctions, because ‘rational’ in the sense 
of thought and behaviour that comply with CL, and ‘reasonable’ behaviour in domains where 
CL is  not  applicable,  are  both part  of  a  continuum defined against  a  scale  of  increasing 
8 In Britain, herring gulls and lesser black-backed gulls are ‘good’ species: they look different, and do 
not interbreed. However, if you trace them around the North Pole, at about the same latitude, you find 
that there is a series of similar-looking, interfertile sub-species that link the two.   
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complexity and ambiguity. (‘Reason’, in O’Sullivan’s sense of an embodiment of the very 
sprit of CL, is an irrelevance.)  
4. Problem Structure and the Concept of Rational Action.
Dethroning conventional logic means that we can no longer use it as the touchstone of 
what is right, reasonable, or rational. This section looks at what we should put in its 
place. In all spheres of practical  activity,  it  is from time to time necessary to take 
decisions  without  sufficient  data  to  make it  possible  to identify  a unique,  optimal 
course  of  action.  In  economics,  it  is  widely  recognized  that  most  entrepreneurial 
activity is of this character; and a minority of writers (E.g., JM Keynes, Frank Knight) 
recognize the distinction between risk and uncertainty proper, and regard choice in 
both these spheres as irrational or arational [38]. Most decisions in basic research, and 
many in strategic research are also of this kind; and there is a direct link to the topic of 
induction, through the necessity to decide which areas to explore with the available 
resources. (The economists’ response has been to ignore the problem, and proceed as 
though all such questions have identifiable, optimal answers, even where this requires 
implausible quantities of data [39].) 
Nobody believes that, in the real world, such decisions can only be made at 
random (though some are, of course), but alternatives are thin on the ground. I am 
claiming that  there  are styles  of conduct,  which I  will  call  ‘rational’,  that  we can 
expect  to  perform  significantly  better  than  random  choice  or  intuition  in 
circumstances which are outside the scope of logic and ‘economic rationality’9; there 
is a considerable body of management science literature on this topic [40, 41]. The 
key to the whole issue is Ian Mitroff’s concept of problem structure [42]. 
Mitroff distinguishes three cases. In  well-structured situations, we are faced 
with problems whose nature is clear and undisputed,  for which there are accepted 
methods of solution, and which are not affected by value or paradigm differences. 
Domain I is well-structured. Here, effective conduct lies in finding the best option, 
9 You are economically rational (ER) if, when confronted by a choice, you take the option that 
promises the maximum net benefit to yourself, taking into account only the current transaction. It is 
only possible o be ER where hazards arise as quantifiable risk, but not from any more radical kind of 
uncertainty. If you advocate being ER as an ideal, you are assuming that actions have no repercussions. 
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and  implementing  that;  and,  accordingly,  methods  for  making  a  selection  from a 
given list of options form an important part  of the decision-maker’s toolkit  in this 
context. We can extract the maximum possible satisfaction from such circumstances 
through  the  successful  solving  of  problems,  without  sacrificing  our  longer-range 
goals, or compromising our values. 
Mitroff defined  ill-structured situations as those in which there is sufficient 
uncertainty and ambiguity that it is possible to dispute the nature of any problem, how 
to solve it, and what counts as a good solution. This corresponds to Domains II and III 
above. Here, our effectiveness depends to a large extent on our skill in framing the 
problem at hand in a potent way, in applying techniques for creatively expanding the 
range of possible  solutions  open to us – and,  equally  important,  in managing our 
choice well, for here, the likelihood of unforeseeable consequences arising from our 
actions  is  always  relatively  high.  Smith  [43]  describes  some  of  the  techniques 
available  for  this  purpose  in  an  R&D  context;  these  are  surprisingly  similar  in 
function to the measures proposed, in a deliberately anarchistic metaphor,  by Paul 
Feyerabend in his attack on the concept of scientific method, Against Method [44]10. 
Here, extracting the maximum available satisfaction from the situation may involve 
the sacrifice of short-run projects, and the modification of longer-range goals. (Very 
occasionally, attempting to do this may force us to reflect on our values, as well.) 
 
Domains  II  and III  represent  complex  situations;  but  there  are  also hyper-
complex situations,  in which political  conflict  is an added ingredient,  i.e.,  there is 
active dissent about which paradigm and set of values should determine the general 
pattern of activity in a community, and the allocation of rights, duties, and benefits 
within  it.  Such  situations  are  undoubtedly  found  in  science,  where  changing 
circumstances have produced a crisis of relevance within a scientific institution (see 
the work cited in Note [43]). Hyper-complexity corresponds to Mitroff’s wickedly-
structured  domain,  where  the  political  skills  of  building  coalitions,  neutralizing 
opponents,  gaining  control  of  resources,  gaining  control  of  critical  posts  and 
functions, moving disputes into more congenial forums, and moulding public opinion, 
are  fundamental  to  effectiveness.  The  participants  gain  satisfaction  through  two 
10 In attacking a particular method for approaching scientific problems, he ended up putting forward a 
method of his own. 
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channels, advancing their systems of values, and advancing their factional interests; 
short-run objectives and medium-term goals and strategies may well be abandoned or 
deeply modified in this process [45], and if things go badly wrong, the only source of 
any satisfaction may be through achieving survival, regardless of sacrifice. 
5. Defining Science In an Inductive World.
5.1 Defining ‘Science’.  
The most commonly advocated scientific methodology is falsificationism. Karl Popper [46, 
47] said that, as induction is reprehensible and logically dangerous, we should avoid it by 
being bold and creative in putting forward hypotheses, but that those hypotheses had to be 
capable  of  implying  (sensu  stricto)  testable  consequences.  They  had  to  have  some 
consequence of the form, ‘if we do X, then we shall observe Y’. If Y is not observed in the 
test, the parent hypothesis has to be abandoned; and objective knowledge is supposed to grow 
by the accumulation of hypotheses that have been corroborated by surviving such tests. The 
more of them, and the more stringent they have been, the greater should be our confidence in 
the relevant hypothesis. Under this scheme, there can be no such thing as ‘proof’ (but that is 
true of all science, anyway). According to Popper, only hypotheses or theories that support 
such testable implications are scientific.  
Falsificationism has a number of very significant drawbacks (see Box 6): it is 
largely unworkable,  and it  ignores  one real  advantage  of  the much-maligned (but 
heavily  used)  confirmationist  approach.  If  induction  is  rehabilitated,  neither 
falsificationism nor its associated definition – that science consists, exclusively, of the 
production and testing of falsifiable hypotheses – has any rationale.  Science can be 
better defined as the activity of constructing theories, composed of networks of explanations 
of reproducible phenomena, through a process of inference to the best explanation (IBEx) 
[48]. (‘Explanation’ is, by definition, contrastive: an explanation says why  this is the case, 
rather  than  that. Mechanisms  that  could  equally  well  generate  the  opposite  of  what  is 
observed are not explanations [49].) These explanations are based on data that are ‘objective’ 
data, i.e., not determined by the whim of individual observers in comparable circumstances. 
‘Theories’  implies  that  some  as-yet  unobserved  entity  exists,  that  would  explain  the 
observations. 
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Box 6: 
The Limitations of Falsificationism.
Apart  from the  ‘Domains’  issue  identified  in  the  text,  the  primary  problem is  that  no  scientific 
hypothesis consists of a single, crisply-formulated proposition: the substantive hypothesis itself will 
always be associated with a complex of other propositions, describing the other elements of the 
particular  science  on  which  the  former  depends.  When some  implication  of  the  hypothesis  is 
falsified, there is no way of knowing which parts of this complex are actually at fault. This limitation 
was strongly emphasized by Kuhn, and Popper was aware of it. (As a logical objection to testing 
propositions by falsificationism in general, it goes right back to the work of Pierre Duhem, at the 
beginning of the 20th Century.) At first sight, it might seem that a possible falsificationist response 
would be to determine the logical structure of the main hypothesis, and attempt to corroborate each 
part of it, to determine the point of failure. However, since each of these parts is only corroborated, 
not proven – and not necessarily strongly corroborated at that – this will  not work. (There is an 
additional difficulty: some of the supporting propositions may represent unrecognised assumptions.)
   
In addition, falsificationism seems to exclude many propositions and activities that would 
normally  be  taken  as  scientific,  on  the  grounds  that  they  are  inherently  incapable  of  yielding 
falsifiable  consequences:  evolutionary  theory,  patterns  such  as  that  in  the  Periodic  Table,  and 
propositions such as ‘all ionic compounds have sharply-defined melting points’ are all labelled as 
unscientific. The line that falsificationism draws between scientific and unscientific seems, for all 
normal purposes, arbitrary – it even excludes the process of formulating hypotheses. 
Finally,  the  fact  of  natural  kinds  suggests  one  reason  why,  in  reality,  scientists  prefer 
confirmationism to  falsificationism,  despite Karl  Popper’s  confident  strictures against  the former. 
Suppose we have what appears to be a uniform population, e.g., a population of species of fungi, all 
of them parasites afflicting crops; and that we have the hypothesis that all of them contaminate the 
seed  of  their  hosts,  as  their  sole  means  of  propagation.  (This  would  have  important  practical 
implications,  and  substantial  theoretical  interest,  whether  confirmed  across  a  wide  sample  of 
species, or shown to have systematic exceptions, cf [50].) There is no falsificationist route forward 
here;  the only way is  to examine as many different  fungus/  host  combinations as possible;  but 
seeking confirmation – necessarily by looking at a wide variety of cases – will tend to identify any 
significant sub-categories within what we hypothesized (perhaps with reservations) to be a uniform 
group. Popper had to assume we are always working with a known, pre-existing, crisp classification, 
in order to be able to apply his chosen ‘calculus of rationality’, viz, conventional logic. 
At any one point, there will almost always be alternative explanations for a given set 
of phenomena, and the choice of which is ‘best’ will inevitably involve historical and psycho-
social  factors.  Paradigms,  research  traditions,  and  research  programmes  (see  Box  7)  all 
represent attempts to explain how they operate. Similar entities have, in particular contexts, 
been  called  thoughtworlds,  worldviews,  weltanshauungen,  mindsets,  and  professional 
imageries; nor do the theories of the physical and social worlds revealed by ethnographic 
techniques seem to be of a fundamentally different kind from these pre-scientific structures. 
Even  political  factors  play  a  part,  either  within  disciplines  [51],  or  between  a  group  of 
disciplines and the wider society in which they are embedded [52]. 
This definition implies a position that I am calling ‘constrained realism’. This holds 
that there is ‘truth’ ‘out there’, i.e., some parts of what we perceive as external to the core of 
our own minds are independent of what those minds think should be there [53]; this is a 
proposition for  which there  is  strong inductive  evidence.  Because of  the  factors  outlined 
above, and because the rate at which a given science can grow depends upon its current size, 
its coverage of its chosen area, and its current stock of techniques and concepts, the process of 
gaining a scientific understanding of the world will be a slow and tortuous one. Because it is 
necessarily  based  on  provisional  assumptions,  any  of  which  may  be  overthrown  –  the 
Heavens revolve around the Earth; humans belong, mentally, to the genus Homo economicus, 
etc – it may also be marked by major, temporarily disruptive revisions. All this implies that 
science will not always be able to give conclusive guidance on practical matters. It should not, 
for this reason, be given a ‘final arbiter’ status in ill-structured policy choices (and will not be 
permitted that status in wickedly-structured ones by the actors involved) – although that is, in 
effect, what has been given to mainstream economics in relation to many important political 
choices. 
It should also be said that some social scientists reject the idea of objective truth, and 
this position, relativism, is dealt with in the final section.  
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Box 7: Socio-Psychological Effects In Science.
Thomas Kuhn first gained general recognition of such effects, with The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
[54]. He showed that, in the various physical sciences, there had been extended periods during which the 
ruling theoretical model suffered from a growing list of known anomalies; and these were accommodated 
by increasingly unsatisfactory compromises. Eventually, the pressure of accumulated anomalies and the 
arrival  of  a  potent  new model  led  to  the  overthrow  and  replacement  of  the  incumbent  model;  it  is 
impossible to compare the state of knowledge before and after one of these revolutions, because the 
definition of the nature of the discipline has changed so radically (e.g., before and after the Copernican 
revolution). He explained the persistence of core models, despite such accumulations, as the effect of 
paradigms, visions of the ‘true nature’ of the phenomena in the particular field, transmitted by the social 
processes by which scientists are inducted into their profession, that blind their inhabitants to alternative 
ways of seeing the phenomena in their field, or drawing its boundaries. These visions determine what are 
taken to be reasonable questions, sound evidence, etc. Anomalies that might undermine the vision are 
ignored, or neutralized, e.g., by denying the validity of certain sorts of evidence. This tends to give each 
discipline a protected core of ideas. 
Opaque Kuhnian paradigms are a real feature of the scientific scene; see [55]. However, they are 
not  the  only  entities  of  this  kind.  Those  who  challenge  such  a  vision  of  reality  are  putting  forward 
something rather more in the nature of a Lakatian research programme [56]: a vision of a sequence of 
problems, placed in the order in which they need to be addressed. (The challengers can see the defects of 
the ruling paradigm, but not the one within which they themselves operate.) This ordering, together with a 
set  of  techniques,  forms the  positive heuristic of  a RP; each RP also has a protected core,  a set  of 
founding assumptions protected by a  negative heuristic, a set of foundational beliefs that, if  there is a 
conflict, take priority over empirical results. Like Kuhnian paradigms, Lakatian research programmes also 
do exist in the real world. Most (sub-) disciplines are demarcated by a paradigm – which their members 
take as a direct view of the very bedrock of reality – and one or more research programmes which their 
members share. The difference between a paradigm and one of these programmes is that Imre Lakatos 
did not share Kuhn’s belief in the impossibility of individual investigators escaping from their discipline’s 
shared, communal vision of the true nature of its subject matter: Lakatos’ programmes (RPs) are adopted, 
consciously and voluntarily, by the individual researcher, who may switch back and forth between them. 
He also drew attention to the two types of criteria that working scientists use in making that choice: those 
they apply to established RPs (solidity and significance of actual achievements), and those they apply to 
new RPs (promise of solving intransigent anomalies). 
Larry Laudan made two further significant contributions to the debate [57]. Firstly, he pointed out 
that anomalies may be tolerated, if they persist long enough, and if there is no alternative that is capable 
of doing all that the incumbent theory can do, and handling the anomaly as well. Secondly, he presented 
cases in which a dominant paradigm – and its image of reality – simply faded away, when changes in the 
wider intellectual culture (in which science is always embedded) eroded the credibility of that image.  
6. Objections to Relativism. 
I am primarily concerned here with the doctrine that the beliefs of all communities are of 
equal standing, none being more well-founded than others. (This cuts across many field of 
interest, not just the sciences, of course.) Relativists assert that we have no right to claim that 
(for example) the modern geological account of the origin of the major features of the Earth is 
more  true,  or  arrived  at  by  more  rational  methods,  than  accounts  that  attribute  them to 
conflicts  among  gods.  If  some  of  us  justify  our  preferences  for  explanation  in  terms  of 
validity or truth, it is simply that that is how our culture defends its preferences (relativists 
often ignore the requirement for explanation to be contrastive). 
It is, of course, true that what we choose to focus on, and how we interpret it, are 
strongly influenced  by the  conceptual  structures  that  we  have called paradigms,  research 
programmes,  etc.  However,  to  suggest  that  we can never  get  beyond these  limitations  is 
preposterous: in many areas, we have no strong theoretical preconceptions to direct us; and 
sometimes, we are confounded by observations that contradict our expectations, or even show 
us that they were based on a misconception of the nature of the situation; for examples, see 
[58]. Social forces, whether exclusively within science (e.g., resistance to the prion concept), 
or linked to the wider social milieu (as seems to have been the case with the virtual taboo on 
research into group selection and altruism [59]), are strong; but so are those that drive radical 
change in science.  The pioneer who overturns some deeply entrenched belief  often reaps 
substantial professional rewards that more than compensate for the initial obloquy (Stanley 
Prusiner of prion fame being a fairly recent example), although it is fair to say that many are 
drawn on by the intense curiosity that  is an important  (if  sporadic) component  of  human 
nature. Also, few modern scientific cultures are monolithic: for every entrenched minority 
view, there is a minority waiting to welcome its overthrow. 
Relativists offer three main types of argument. The first is linguistic, and it claims to 
have  demonstrated  two  principles:  that  our  classification  of  the  world  is  determined 
exclusively by the cultural fact of language, and is not based on any independent reality; and 
that the problems of translating between cultures that use different languages are such that 
there can be no conclusive debate on what is real and fundamental. The second argument is 
that formal logic11 is itself local and culture bound12;  and the third, that because what we 
choose to pay attention to and how we interpret it is determined by our culture, there cannot 
11 I am not aware of any relativist literature that attempts to extend this argument beyond CL. 
12 It is, of course, true that culture and history have made an important contribution to the status 
accorded to CL. 
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be any core of basic facts and concepts that all informed observers will agree on. A widely-
quoted paper by Barnes and Bloor [60] set out these arguments in detail; the first aspect of the 
linguistic argument is, of course, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (which, unfortunately, is widely 
taken as confirmed fact). 
  
Linguistic relativism  (i) The contrast between the sort of constrained realism adopted here on 
the one hand, and relativism on theory other, is strongly influenced by different views about 
language. Many years ago, Benjamin Whorf, the anthropologist, wrote that: 
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and  
types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they  
stare  every  observer  in  the  face;  on  the  contrary,  the  world  is  presented  in  a  
kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds—and this  
means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it  
into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to  
an agreement to organize it in this way - an agreement that holds throughout our  
speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is,  
of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we 
cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data  
which the agreement decrees. [61]  
If  this  is  true,  it  would,  of  course,  eliminate  the  concept  of  ‘natural  kinds’;  and 
because of the reciprocal  relationship between classification and theory – what  we see is 
affected by what we think should be there, how we theorize depends on what we think we see 
– it would undermine any claim to objective theory. However, Whorf is begging the question: 
it is only justifiable to assume that our ability to parse the world into distinct components gets 
no help from the fact that there are many distinct kinds of objects out there, provided that you 
already know that there is no such external (or, at least, independent) reality. Secondly, he is 
making a major  assumption.  Learning about  social  entities and constructs may not  all  be 
based on language: we infer a lot about social facts inductively,  by our own observations 
(although we almost certain do not do that in such a regular, accurate way that we all share 
precisely the same notions, norms, etc). 
 Linguistic relativism (ii:) the translation problem. As a corollary to the Sapir-Whorf thesis 
[62], that the languages of different cultures embody such divergent views of the world that 
communication between them is impossible, Barnes and Bloor (‘B&B’, from here on) put 
forward the translation problem. This is the alleged impossibility of knowing that we have 
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successfully translated the meaning of an utterance, document, etc between two languages. 
But what sort of thing would it be, that could not be translated? It would have to be something 
that has no concrete manifestations whatsoever (and that includes behaviour and speech), so 
that it is impossible to establish the fact that, for example, some of what we put in category X, 
they identify as belonging to  Y  and  Z.  As soon as we can do that,  we can start  to apply 
inductive  methods  to  build  our  theories  of  what  ‘they’  think  they are  doing,  and why – 
explaining both in our own language. (Indeed, Sapir himself frequently does exactly that [63], 
for  example,  in  explaining  how the  Navajo  perception  of  time  differs  radically from the 
Western one.) Of course we may always commit an inductive error in the course of this, but 
that  danger  is  inescapable  from  investigation  in  the  real  world.  Relativists  seem  to  be 
complaining that  rationalists  cannot  prove that  they have a guaranteed method of  getting 
perfect knowledge, which, as far as the real world is concerned, does not exist, of course. 
There are a couple of holes in that particular bucket, however – and the relativists themselves 
put one of them there, when they threw out (conventional) logic.  
Logic.    B&B claim that logic is esoteric and ad hoc. One of their examples is ‘implication’, 
which (in CL) is defined in such a way that a contradiction implies any other proposition, true 
or false. They go on to state that, if there are any informal intuitive methods of reasoning, 
they are ipso facto without reasoned justification; and that anything that can be justified with 
such reasoning will therefore not be universal, but merely local in its credibility. To make this 
work, you have to accept that B&B’s original observation, ‘[some] logics are esoteric and ad 
hoc’ supports the proposition that all logics are share that weakness13. But this is not the case: 
for example, fuzzy logic is designed to formalize natural reasoning, and it does so without 
introducing esoteric new operations or concepts. There are a number of other assumptions 
here: that only deductive logic (which they are trying to reject!) can provide ‘justification’, 
and that there are no universally used sound, informal, and intuitive methods of reasoning.  
Lack of a ‘core’. Relativists do seem to accept that there are certain basic things that can be 
learnt in a unique way by induction, so that everybody, everywhere agrees on them (B&B talk 
about navigation skills, not falling into rivers, etc); and no relativist, as far as I know, has ever 
claimed that culture can overwhelm the real-world factors that teach us all that (subject to 
some  easily-stated  physical  conditions)  fire  burns  flesh,  for  example.  Realists  (including 
constrained  realists)  see  such  consensus  on  such  matters  as  a  potential  bridge  for 
communication between different communities. Relativists deny this possibility, saying that 
such skills are irrelevant to this bridge-building, because they are shared with other species 
13 Note the important difference between induction based on ‘some’ (of an extensive sample) and 
induction based on ‘some’ (from a sample of one).  
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that do not possess language, and that it is wrong in principle to mix unverbalized learning 
with what is communicated by language. 
But why should we accept this? In many areas of life, there is continuity across this 
supposedly impassable  barrier  between the  linguistic  and non-linguistic.  The most  telling 
counter-example is provided by our ethical behaviour and knowledge. Some of our ethical 
behaviour  does  seem to  be  learnt  by  ‘embedded’  induction:  the  inhabitants  of  complex 
systems are under a lot of evolutionary pressure to develop accommodative and even altruistic 
patterns of interaction with their fellows [64]. This adaptive response to living as part of a 
complex system is now built into our physiology at a sub-cognitive level: we have the same 
neural responses – diluted or modified by our closeness to the other – when we see another 
undergoing a painful, joyous, frightening, etc experience, as when we undergo that sort of 
experience ourselves. And, having the same neural responses, it is reasonable to infer that we 
have similar mental responses [65]. In addition, we absorb standards of behaviour; in some 
cases, this happens through individual learning, and is a matter for cognitive psychology; but 
some  is  indeed  cultural  –  and,  of  that  some  at  least  has  been  absorbed  unconsciously. 
Certainly, some has also been absorbed through language (and other systems of symbols). But 
where is the impassable barrier between the biological and the social/ linguistic realms here? 
©Peter Smith, 12 January 2009. 
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